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Fuzzy Similarity Measures Approach in 
Benchmarking Taxonomies of Threats against SMEs 
in Developing Economies 
Ezer Osei Yeboah-Boateng 
Abstract — There are various threats that militate against 
SMEs in developing economies.  However, most SMEs fall on 
the conservative “TV News Effect” of most-publicized cyber-
threats or incidences, with disproportionate mitigation 
measures.  This paper endeavors to establish a taxonomy of 
threat agents to fill in the void.  Various fuzzy similarity 
measures based on multi-attribute decision-making techniques 
have been employed in the evaluation.  The taxonomy offers a 
panoramic view of cyber-threats in assessing mission-critical 
assets, and serves as a benchmark for initiating appropriate 
mitigation strategies.  SMEs in developing economies were 
strategically interviewed for their expert opinions on various 
business and security metrics.  The study established that 
natural disasters, which are perennial in most developing 
economies, are the most critical cyber-threat agent, whilst 
social engineering is the least critical threat. 
1
 
 
Key Words — Fuzzy Similarity Measures, Threats, Vulnerabilities, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper estimates a taxonomy of threat agents which 
confronts SMEs in developing economies, by using fuzzy 
similarity measures for multi-attribute decision-making 
(MADM) techniques. 
The taxonomy defines a set of threat agents organized in the 
order of most likely or critical to the less likely or minor for 
the threat agents.  The taxonomy provides a benchmark of 
cyber-security challenges by which SMEs can mitigate risks in 
their systems and networks. 
This benchmark offers a common platform about SMEs 
assets importance or criticality labels that ought to be 
appropriately safeguarded. 
SMEs constitute the majority of businesses in most 
economies; so the extent and severity of cyber-threats could 
have dire consequences on the adoption and provisioning of 
many ICT services and products.  Though, the potential of 
cyber-risks to SMEs could be catastrophic, there is little or no 
literature or documentation on the vulnerabilities and threats to 
SMEs [1].  Obviously, a better appreciation of cyber-security 
challenges with SMEs could ensure secured businesses and 
 
1 Ezer O. Yeboah-Boateng is a Ph.D. Fellow with the center for 
Communications, Media & Information technologies (CMI), department of 
Electronic Systems, at Aalborg University in Copenhagen, Denmark. (e-mail: 
ezer@es.aau.dk or ezer@cmi.aau.dk  ).  
avoid the pitfalls associated with “unwanted business risks” 
[1]. 
It must be noted that accurately identifying critical assets 
can lead to proactive detective and preventive measures that 
eventually mitigates the susceptibility of the vulnerabilities and 
thus, curtail the impending threats against the SME assets. 
Also, the threat agents taxonomy provides panoramic view 
of the extent and severity of threats militating against SMEs 
assets and resources.  It can also assist in the appropriate 
determination and formulation of mitigation strategies and 
policies for the SMEs. 
Based on an empirical study on cyber-security challenges 
confronting SMEs in developing economies, a set of mission-
critical assets were analyzed vis-à-vis the extent and severity 
of cyber-threats, the following threat agents taxonomy is 
enlisted: 
 {Natural disasters > Poor authentication > Viruses 
(Malwares) > Hacking > No Backup > Spywares 
(Adwares) > Power failure > Un-scanned attachments > 
Spam > Social engineering} [2] 
 
1.1.  Multi-Attribute Decision-Making (MADM) 
Basic decision making problems that face many SMEs are 
made in view of uncertainties such as cost, outcome and 
associated implications, etc.  SMEs usually have a number of 
possible decision choices or options, and an array of possible 
outcomes to choose from [3].   
In day-to-day business settings, managers and operatives are 
confronted with numerous decision scenarios where some 
managers may differ in decision choices based on their 
“perceptions, attitudes, motivations and personalities” [4].  It 
is also not uncommon to have managers or operatives, 
heretofore referred to as “experts
2
” [5] to have divergent 
views.  In all cases a common denominator is defined, such as 
a cumulative or aggregated expert opinion or judgment that 
becomes representative of the group of experts. The 
aggregates are usually weighted based on various parameters 
ranging from educational background, experience in specified 
fields, management, responsibility or ethics, etc. 
Due to the uncertainties in business decision making, many 
probabilistic assessments render the decision model less 
 
2 Bilal Ayyub [5] defines an expert as “a very skillful person who [has] had 
much training and has knowledge in a specialized field”.  
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effective, unless the intrinsic attributes or vagueness are taken 
into consideration. On the other hand, fuzzy based possibilistic 
assessment is capable of handling the vagueness and 
imprecision in the linguistic decision choices [6] [7] [4].   
The notion of threat agents assessment is complex and has 
lots of uncertainties.  So any strategy or solution to assess 
cyber-risk with probability is like avoiding risk complexities 
and uncertainty measures [2], and instead render the 
probabilistic risk assessment model “a process that attempts to 
guess rather than formally predict the future on the basis of 
statistical evidence” [8]. 
Even though probabilistic assessment is said to be based on 
sound mathematical theory of probability, it undoubtedly uses 
some subjective and qualitative guesstimates [9].  Shaurette [9] 
posited that these qualitative risk values may be appropriately 
estimated based on rules, such as fuzzy inference rules, that 
capture the “consensus” opinions of cyber-security experts.  
In this paper, fuzzy similarity measures are used in 
evaluating the extent and severity of the threats against 
important or critical assets.  The fuzzy multi-attribute decision-
making (MADM) based taxonomy on threat agents seeks to 
motivate SMEs to proactively analyze the various imperative 
factors critical to the security and business operations.  This 
multifaceted assessment is fraught with subjective 
considerations and uncertainties. 
1.1.1. Taxonomy 
Taxonomy from its roots in Greek means method of 
arrangement.  In academia, it is often used in defining the 
arrangements or order in which groups in sample populations 
fall in place.  It is also used in grouping elements with certain 
characteristics or attributes and usually ranked based on the 
unique characteristics of interest. 
1.1.2. Benchmarking 
Benchmarking is a process of comparing an organization’s 
business or security metrics with individual or sectorial best 
practices.  In cyber-security, the metrics or constructs of 
interest are dimensioned in terms of susceptibility, reliability, 
resilience and the ability to continue business operations even 
in the event of cyber incidents.   
Benchmarking connotes the notion of comparing a 
measured or observed construct with a standard construct 
assumed to be one of the best measured or observed, in 
accordance with one’s industry standards.  Typically, the 
standardized constructs aid in operational or strategic 
improvement and efficiency.  In cyber-security, the object of 
benchmarking is to facilitate proactive risk mitigation and to 
avoid certain pitfalls experienced by some industry 
practitioners.  Strategically, it promotes effective and efficient 
risk identification and assessment, as well as overall risk 
management. 
1.2. SMEs in Developing Economies 
SMEs in developing economies are characterized by low 
and uncertain revenues [10].  Information systems projects in 
developing economies are characterized by socio-economic 
changes or transformations, as well as knowledge transfer and 
improved skillset to the SMEs.  Walsham & Sahay [11] 
examined various literatures on information systems research 
in developing economies, and underscored their relevance.  
The emergence of Internet facilities in developing economies 
have impacted positively on societies and organizations , 
especially in areas of connection costs, access speeds and end-
users utilization [12]. 
Ellefsen & von Solms [12]  posited that developing 
economies are, in many instances, overwhelmed by the 
massive and rapid improvements of the emerging technologies 
in ICTs.  For instance, most SMEs do not have any programs 
in place to harness the increased bandwidth, with its attendant 
vulnerability challenges confronting their systems and their 
customers.  SMEs in developing economies are said to have 
unique challenges, and so “direct” importation of existing ICT 
solutions from the developed economies may not necessarily 
address the issues effectively [12]. 
Developing economies have embraced the emergence of 
ICT technologies to promote their development agenda and to 
present new opportunities for economic empowerment of its 
citizenry.  In an ITU organized forum in December, 2011, the 
panelists underscored the need for developing economies to be 
pragmatic about cyber-security risks, stressing the criticality to 
emerging economies [13]. 
ITU-T [14] in the “Guide to Cyber-security for Developing 
Countries” alludes to the common areas of cyber-security 
solutions amongst nation states, but concedes that developing 
economies have peculiar challenges, requiring customized 
solutions.  In view of the above, this empirical study is geared 
to assist SMEs in developing economies with threat agents 
taxonomy based on simple but intuitive fuzzy similarity 
measures. 
1.2.1. Security Challenges with SMEs  
SMEs are conceptually characterized as that firm, which are 
small in size in comparison to large or multi-national 
corporations [15].  SMEs are usually typified by the following  
characteristics [15]: 
 SMEs have centralized management; 
 SMEs have a low level of labor specialization; 
 SMEs have simple, informal, direct internal and external 
information systems; and  
 SMEs have intuitive, implicit and short-term strategy. 
The concept of engaging external resources for information 
systems management raises some challenges. Today’s 
management information systems are typified by ensuring that 
data and all corporate assets are properly safeguarded.  
Though, most SMEs may outsource that important component 
of its business, some may resort to using internal resources 
which are usually not up-to-speed with most security 
developments in order to save cost.   
Canadian Journal on Computing in Mathematics, Natural Sciences, Engineering and Medicine Vol. 4 No. 1, February 2013 
 
36 
 
Julien’s [15] concept of simple external information systems 
whereby the owner-director is supposed to be in total control 
of all operations may not be the case in today’s cyber-
economies.  SMEs today, though still small in size relatively, 
are connected with the rest of the world via the Internet.  They 
may have websites which could have its own vulnerabilities.  
Customers and vendors, as well as some mobile workers, may 
log-in remotely, all posing some security challenges to the 
SMEs. 
Contributing to Julien’s concepts, [16] posits that “the 
means of obtaining information are a group of interpersonal 
and informal relationships which are non-institutionalized and 
unstructured”.  Again, SMEs today have established structured 
and standardized forms of communications and information 
gathering, such as the use of emails. Invoices and tender 
documents are submitted via email or web portals, meetings 
are held via Skype, formal and informal communications take 
place via Instant Messengers (IMs), etc.  As long as important 
business communications take place via the electronic media, 
the confidentiality of the information or data must be 
protected, the integrity must be ensured, and that the channels 
must be available whenever needed [2].  Any breach or 
compromise of any of these security concerns are the 
motivations for this research. 
Pierre [17] in examining cyber-crime activities indicated 
that “many SMEs do not consider themselves as having data 
that is of interest to cyber-criminals and quite often dismiss the 
need for properly addressing vulnerabilities in their 
infrastructure”.  He continued that “the opposite is true; every 
business today collects data on employees, customers and 
vendors that are of interest to cyber-criminals”.  
Whereas cyber-security vulnerabilities pose serious 
concerns to all businesses, SMEs are usually hard hit victims 
and find it very difficult to recover after a cyber-attack.  
Invariably, SMEs are easier targets than large corporations.  
Large corporations have, in recent times, strengthened their 
security systems, either as a response to the increased threats 
or in compliance with regulations.   
Globalization and the advancement in Internet technologies 
have incited SMEs into positioning themselves from small 
regional based companies to become global, cross-border 
companies.  SMEs are seizing the opportunities offered by 
globalization to gain access to strategic markets.  Whereas, 
these trends come with many more opportunities for SMEs, 
they also pose some risks; - the cyber-threats aspects of which 
are the focus of this study.   
Sharma et al [18] provide an overview of the cyber-attacks 
which prospective customers of e-commerce are likely to 
encounter while carrying out transactions over the web.  They 
provide a detailed account of highly specialized attacks that 
are aimed at SMEs.  Rapid diffusion of e-commerce and a 
rising number of interconnected networks have resulted in an 
escalation of security threats [19].  
1.2.2. SMEs Security: Impact on Business Operations 
Though SMEs have been persuaded into moving with the 
information based bandwagon, incidentally, these 
opportunities have their corresponding challenges that threaten 
the SMEs, especially cyber-security related issues of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) vulnerabilities, 
as those weaknesses are exploited by threat agents.  The 
resultant adverse effects or impacts on SMEs are seen as 
revenue losses, resources depletion, and loss of customer and 
investor confidence, etc. [2]. 
Risk is seen as the possibility for loss of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability due to a specific threat [20].  
Typically, cyber-security objective is to deter, prevent, detect, 
recover from, and respond to threats in cyberspace.  Cyber-
security is to safeguard the information assets, the information 
systems and networks that deliver the information, from 
damage or compromise resulting from failures of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability [2]. Cyber-security 
infrastructure is multifaceted and it includes information 
technology, procedures and practices, laws and regulations, 
people and organizations; these areas are said to be 
interrelated and impact each other [21].   
1.3. Key Issues  
Organizations all over the world are confronted with cyber-
security breaches with significant costs associated, such as loss 
of corporate image or reputation, lost businesses and legal fees 
[22].  This cost become more profound when SMEs are 
involved, and especially so, when they are located in 
developing or emerging economies.   
Often, SMEs are attempted to consider themselves as not 
having any data that are of interest to any threat agents; that is, 
they are not susceptible to attacks [17].  On the contrary, every 
business in today’s cyber-economies has data that can serve as 
attack vectors to the criminal hackers (crackers) or threat 
agents, in general.  For example, employees or customer data, 
or some intellectual properties are usually highly sought after 
information.   
The issue is what are some of the threat agents that often 
militate against SMEs in developing economies?  What are the 
more probable threats that are likely to impact significantly on 
the SMEs?  What are the extent of impact on the SMEs should 
these threats mature?   
By identifying threat agents in a frequently updated 
taxonomy, SMEs can consistently benchmark with most 
probable threats to their assets [23].  This sort of identification 
is geared towards effective risk management as possible 
consequences can be evaluated and appropriate risk mitigation 
measures proffered proactively [8].   
Generally, there’s lack of standardized lists of threat agents 
and their attributes.  In modeling human threat agents, [23] 
alluded to the prevalent “TV News Effect” of most-publicized 
threats with disproportionate mitigation measures.  This deficit 
of “aggregated, consistent, state-of-the-art” threat agents 
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hamper with effective risk management efforts [23].  This 
paper is, thus, motivated in establishing the taxonomy of threat 
agents amongst SMEs in developing economies as step in 
creating standardized threat agents, which can serve as 
benchmarks .  This is intended to facilitate the building of 
secured organizations across developing economies. 
1.4. Methodology 
This paper is a subset of a broader cyber-security 
vulnerabilities study on SMEs in developing economies.  
Cognizant of the complexities and uncertainties in cyber-
security metrics, the study set off with extensive literature 
review and designed a survey questionnaire philosophy which 
was submitted to five (5) cyber-security practitioners for 
review and comments [2] [24].  Based on their comments and 
advice, a pre-test survey was designed and administered to 
these experts, again for critique. The actual full scale survey 
was then launched and administered using LimeSurvey Online 
(www.limesurvey.com) facilities.  This approach was adopted 
in order to target most SMEs in Ghana and Nigeria; and in 
view of the challenges associated with physically distributing 
questionnaires in the case-study countries.  To ensure credible 
results, a cookie was set-up in the online survey program to 
prevent repeated participation [2]. 
The objective of this paper is to create taxonomy of most 
common threat agents that are most likely to impact on SMEs 
in developing economies.  ICT-based SMEs, financial 
organizations and government agencies were target samples, 
and they were selected by a simple random sampling. For 
instance, the lists of Ghana ISPs Association (GISPA), 
Nigerian Internet Exchange (NIX) Association and 
professional IT experts in Ghana and Nigeria were used [2].    
Research Approach  
In this study, a set of objective-based questionnaire was 
administered to about 500 SMEs in Ghana and Nigeria, via 
email messages and a hypertext link to a web portal where the 
actual survey was administered and processed [2].  
The questionnaire had four (4) categories, namely business 
profile, security posture, cyber-assets classification and 
possibility of occurrences [2].  From the cyber-assets sub-
section, a number of critical assets were evaluated.  Six (6) 
mission-critical assets deduced from the study were DNS 
server, Email server, Routers, Database server, Core Switches 
and Web servers [2], according to the SMEs in developing 
economies. 
Also, from the possibility of occurrences sub-section, a 
number of threat agents were identified as paramount.  Based 
on the above, another web-based survey (under the auspices of 
www.surveygizmo.com) was administered to 20 randomly 
selected cyber-security experts for their opinions.  Fourteen 
(14) out of the 20 respondents were received and those 
constitute the datasets [2] for this paper. 
There was a preamble to the email with a brief on the 
purpose and solicitation, as well as a statement on 
confidentiality. 
The survey first sought to profile the experts based on 
qualifications and experience in ICT security.  Level of 
responsibility is also gauged aimed at ranking the experts’ 
importance and criticality weightings [2]. 
The actual questions were matrices with strategic assets as 
rows and 10 threat agents as columns.  The answers involved 5 
multiple choice drop-down answers per asset-threat-agent 
mapping. 
Lastly, the strategic assets were mapped with perceived 
criticality (impact level) and the urgency with which these 
assets ought to be restored, in the event of a compromise or 
exploitation. 
1.5. Outline 
This introductory section dealt with the multi-attribute 
decision-making and its application to cyber-threats taxonomy, 
which is aimed at benchmarking cyber-assets of SMEs in 
developing economies.   The problem resulting from deficit in 
taxonomy of threat agents concerning SMEs is underscored 
with some key questions raised that beg for redress. 
The next section treats fuzzy aspects of multiple attributes 
decision-making techniques, using fuzzy similarity measures.  
This is followed by some empirical computations to rank the 
various threat agents, which are also discussed at length, in 
terms of characteristics and the possible impacts. 
The paper concludes with some recommendations and 
outlook for future works. 
II. FUZZY MULTI-ATTRIBUTE DECISION-MAKING 
(MADM) 
Here, an approach is employed to rank the decision 
alternatives in multiple attribute decision-making problem of 
enlisting threats as perceived by the experts.  The objective is 
that given ten (10) threat agents deduced from the main study 
as alternatives and evaluated in respect of six (6) susceptible 
cyber-assets, then fuzzy MADM techniques are used to rate 
them in the order of most-to-least. 
It is noted herewith that this study chose to use fuzzy 
triangular numbers (FTNs), for simplicity and ease of 
computation.  For instance, it can be showed that similar 
treatment with fuzzy trapezoidal numbers would yield similar 
results. 
A. Fuzzy Similarity Measures 
Fuzzy Similarity Measures is one of the basic concepts in 
human cognitive endeavors [25].  Fuzzy similarity measures 
finds applications in multi-attribute decision-making (MADM) 
such as “taxonomy, recognition, case-based reasoning” [25].  
There are various aspects of fuzzy similarity measures, which 
are applied for variety and specific purposes [4] [26] etc. 
Fuzzy similarity measures find applications in fuzzy 
ordering or ranking as well as fuzzy analysis of various risk 
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constructs.  In this paper, fuzzy similarity measures are utilized 
in ranking various threat agents that confront SMEs in 
developing economies. 
Beg & Ashraf [25] classified similarity measures into three 
(3) groups, namely: 
i. Metric-based measures; 
ii. Set-theoretic based measures; and 
iii. Implicators based measures. 
This paper dwells on an aspect of the set-theoretic based 
similarity measures.  Indeed, set theoretic similarity measures 
come in two (2) types: crisp logic based and fuzzy logic based.  
Here again, this paper narrows down to the fuzzy logic 
similarity measures or fuzzy similarity measures, for brevity. 
Similarity measures are sometimes referred to in literature 
as degrees or measures of similarity.   
Generally, the fuzzy set theoretic provides the basis for 
generalizing the binary relations amongst any two (2) 
constructs [27]. 
Now, let the fuzzy linguistic variables be defined by the 
tuples { : 1,2,......, }
i
S s i n   such that  iff i < j.
i j
s s   
In this study, 
    
 
1 2 3
4 5
{ min ,   minor,  important, 
 vital,  critical}
S s very or s s
s s
 and the experts are 
1 2 14
{ , ,........., }
i
E E E E , that is the 14 
respondents to the strategic interview survey.   
From the empirical study (c.f. Table -1), expert 
1
E  is 
deemed the most important and assigned relative importance 
of 
1
1r  .  Then, relative importance of the other experts, 
based on education attribute, are 
2 3 10 11 12 13 14
, ,....., 0.8 and , , , 0.6.r r r r r r r   
 
Table 1: Expert Opinions Elicitation Dataset [2] 
experts
Fuzzy 
Triangular 
Numbers(l)
Fuzzy 
Triangular 
Numbers 
(c')
Fuzzy 
Triangular 
Numbers(r')
relative 
importance
degree of 
importance
average 
agreement 
degree
relative 
agreement 
degree
consensus 
degree 
coefficients
E1 8 9 10 1 0.09 0.75 0.06 0.07
E2 6 7.5 9 0.8 0.08 0.88 0.08 0.08
E3 6 7.5 9 0.8 0.08 0.88 0.08 0.08
E4 6 7.5 9 0.8 0.08 0.88 0.08 0.08
E5 6 7.5 9 0.8 0.08 0.88 0.08 0.08
E6 6 7.5 9 0.8 0.08 0.88 0.08 0.08
E7 6 7.5 9 0.8 0.08 0.88 0.08 0.08
E8 6 7.5 9 0.8 0.08 0.88 0.08 0.08
E9 6 7.5 9 0.8 0.08 0.88 0.08 0.08
E10 6 7.5 9 0.8 0.08 0.88 0.08 0.08
E11 3 5 7 0.6 0.06 0.74 0.06 0.06
E12 3 5 7 0.6 0.06 0.74 0.06 0.06
E13 3 5 7 0.6 0.06 0.74 0.06 0.06
E14 3 5 7 0.6 0.06 0.74 0.06 0.06  
 
Various degrees of importance can be computed from the 
equation 
                         
1
;    i
i n
i
i
r
w
r



                           [1-1] 
For any given fuzzy 
sets { } and { },  i = 1,2, ....., n
i i
A a B b   , the grade 
of similarity (or agreement degree) of the fuzzy relations is 
given by 
               




( , )
( )
( )i i
i ii
A B
i ii
a b
S
a b
                   [1-2] 
Equation [1-2] is known as the min-max similarity method 
[28], and the fuzzy sets A and B are said to be approximately 
equal if and only if (iff), there exists a proximity measure, ε, 
[29] such that  
( , ) ( , )
.
i jR R A B
S S    Generally, the fuzzy 
similarity measure estimates the degree of similarity between 
A and B.  Similarity measures are metrics used to indicate the 
degree of similarity amongst constructs. For the two (2) fuzzy 
sets A and B, defined in the universe U, there exists a fuzzy 
relation such that: 
( , ) : ( )* ( ) [0,1]A B A BS x x    is the 
fuzzy similarity measure if and only if the following axioms 
hold true: 
i. 
( , ) ( , );  ,A B B AS S A B U     
ii. 
( , ) 1;  A AS A U    
iii. '( , )
0;  
A A
S A U    
iv. 
( , ) ( , );   and , ,A B B CS S A B C A B C U    
 
Another useful method is that of Zeshui Xu [30] for 
similarity measure given by  
2 1 2 1 2 1
( , )
| | | | | |
1
8i jR R
a a b b c c
S
q
    
         [1-3] 
Where q = 3 for fuzzy triangular numbers and q = 4 for 
fuzzy trapezoidal numbers. 
It is noted that 
( , ) ( , ) 1 2
[0 1] and 1 implies that R  and R
i j i jR R R R
S S 
 are closer to each other.  So 
( , ) 1 2 ( , ) ( , )
1  iff  R  R  and that also 
i j i j j iR R R R R R
S S S  
  
Assume that the fuzzy set 
1 2
{ , ,......, }
n
X x x x  be the set 
of alternatives and 
1 2
{ , ,......, }
m
U u u u  be the set of 
attributes.  Then for a given degree of importance or weights 
vector 
1 2
{ , ,......., };  w 0; i = 1,2, ....., m.
m i
w w w w    the 
linguistic decision matrix or agreement fuzzy matrix (AM) is 
computed as  
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11 12 1
1 2
n
mxn
m m mn
S S S
AM
S S S
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       [1-4] 
or ( )
mxn ij mxn
AM a   where [      ]a b c
ij ij ij ij
a a a a S   is 
the attribute value, which takes the form of a fuzzy triangular 
linguistic variable, given by the decision maker, for the 
alternative 
j
x X  with respect to the attribute 
i
u U .  It 
follows that for a vector of attribute values 
1 2
( , ,......., )
j j j mj
a a a a  it corresponds with the alternative 
: 1,2,......,
j
x j n . 
There exists an ideal point of attribute values, where 
[ , , ]a b c
i i i i
I I I I  such that 
max{ },  max{ },  max{ }.a a b b c c
i ij i ij i ij
I a I a I a     
Besides the min-max and Xu’s fuzzy similarity measures, 
the following techniques have also been considered in 
evaluating the 10 threat agents in the taxonomy. 
 Koczy & W-S Method [31]: 
 
 
 


 
 


( , )
1
1
1 | ( ) ( )|
             = 1 | ( ) ( )|
i iA B
A i B ii
A i B ii
S
x x
x x
  [1-5] 
 Guoshun & Yunsheng Method [32] 
 
 
 

 

( , )
| ( ) ( )|
| ( ) ( )|i i
A i B ii
A B
A i B ii
n x x
S
n x x
               [1-6] 
 Wang et al Method [33] 
  


( , )
|1 ( ( ) ( ))|
i i
A i B ii
A B
x x
S
n
            [1-7] 
 Hsieh & Chen Method [34] 
 

  

1
( , )
1
1 ( , )
1 ( , )i iA B
S d A B
d A B
         [1-8] 
Where ( , ) | ( ) ( ) |d A B P A P B   and 
1 2 3 1 2 32 2( ) ;  ( ) ;
4 4
a a a b b b
P A P B
   
    
Using the empirical data on the 14 experts, 10 key cyber-
security threat agents were identified and enlisted as the most 
common threat agents (vectors) of cyber-security compromises 
that affect the SMEs.   
III.  KEY THREATS EVALUATED 
This sub-section deals with the actual computations leading 
to the ranking of threat agents in the taxonomy. 
First the attributes are assigned fuzzy triangular numbers 
and weights vector based on the relative frequencies, 
(0.10,  0.14, 0.24, 0.20, 0.15, 0.17)w  . 
The vector of alternatives for each threat agent is 
( 1,2,.....,10)
j
X j   are deduced.  For example, 
 

11 21
31
(4.5   6.39   7.78),  a (5.43   6.82   8.21),  
a (6.93   8.03   9.14), etc.
a
  
From here, the ideal points are also determined 
1 2 10
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ,......, )I I I I  where ˆ max{ }
i ijj
I a .  This implies 
that 
1 2
ˆ ˆ(6.93    8.03    9.14) and (5.43    6.72    8.0)I I 
 etc.   
The similarity measures ˆ
j
Z  are computed for each of the 
attributes and then the overall values as well. Thus,  
1 1 11 2 21 6 61
ˆ
 i = 1,2, ...., 6 and j = 1, 2, ....., 10
ˆ  .......
j i ij
Z w a
where
Z w a w a w a

    

        [1-9] 
Computing the overall or aggregated similarity measure as  
    
* 1 11 2 21 10 10
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ........Z w I w I w I                  [1-10] 
Where 
i
w  is obtained from the relative importance. 
*
ˆ   (6.12    7.40   8.68)Z    
Table -2 below depicts the resulting computations from the 
above treatment : 
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Table 2: Resulting Computations 
ˆ
i
Z   FTN Ideal Point ˆ
i
I   FTN 
1
Ẑ   (5.85  7.11  8.37) 
1
Î   (6.93  8.03  9.14) 
2
Ẑ   (4.74  6.10  7.46) 
2
Î   (5.43  6.72  8.00) 
3
Ẑ   (3.53  5.06  6.59) 
3
Î   (4.93  6.40  7.86) 
4
Ẑ   (5.77  7.03  8.30) 
4
Î   (6.64  7.85  9.06) 
5
Ẑ   (4.87  6.22  7.58) 
5
Î   (5.78  7.10  8.42) 
6
Ẑ   (5.51  6.80  8.10) 
6
Î   (6.80  7.90  9.00) 
7
Ẑ   (5.69  7.07  8.45) 
7
Î   (6.40  7.65  8.90) 
8
Ẑ   (4.25  5.76  7.27) 
8
Î   (5.40  6.95  8.50) 
9
Ẑ   (3.34  4.93  6.52) 
9
Î   (4.90  6.40  7.90) 
10
Ẑ   (6.91  8.07  9.23) 
10
Î   (8.00 9.00 10.00) 
 
 
The similarity degrees of the alternatives are subsequently 
determined as in the Table -3 below. 
 
Table -3: Results of Similarity Measures on Threats Taxonomy 
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ˆ ˆ( , )Z Z
S   0
.96 
0
.96 
0
.77 
0
.53 
0.
71 
0.
55 
* 2
ˆ ˆ( , )Z Z
S  0
.82 
0
.84 
0
.43 
0
.20 
-
0.30 
-
0.13 
* 3
ˆ ˆ( , )Z Z
S  0
.68 
0
.71 
0
.30 
0
.12 
-
1.34 
-
0.40 
* 4
ˆ ˆ( , )Z Z
S  0
.95 
0
.95 
0
.71 
0
.43 
0.
57 
0.
39 
* 5
ˆ ˆ( , )Z Z
S  0
.84 
0
.85 
0
.46 
0
.22 
-
0.18 
-
0.08 
* 6
ˆ ˆ( , )Z Z
S  0
.92 
0
.93 
0
.63 
0
.36 
0.
40 
0.
25 
* 7
ˆ ˆ( , )Z Z
S  0
.96 
0
.96 
0
.75 
0
.50 
0.
67 
0.
50 
* 8
ˆ ˆ( , )Z Z
S  0
.78 
0
.80 
0
.38 
0
.17 
0.
64 
-
0.24 
* 9
ˆ ˆ( , )Z Z
S  0
.67 
0
.69 
0
.29 
0
.12 
-
1.47 
-
0.42 
* 10
ˆ ˆ( , )Z Z
S  0
.92 
0
.92 
0
.60 
0
.33 
0.
33 
0.
20 
 
By definition of the fuzzy similarity measures, i.e. mapping 
into the unit interval [0,1], it is obvious that some of the 
methods do not strictly comply with the axioms.  However, 
they all rank the alternatives in exact manner.  Deducing from 
the above, the ranking of alternative threat agents are: 
1 7 4 6 10 5 2 8 3 9
X X X X X X X X X X        
  
The taxonomy of threat agents as perceived by SMEs in 
developing economies are from the most likely attacks to the 
least, as follows: 
i. Natural disasters 
ii. Poor authentication 
iii. Viruses and malware 
iv. Hacking 
v. No backup 
vi. Spyware and adware 
vii. Power failure 
viii. Un-scanned attachments 
ix. Spam 
x. Social engineering. 
  
IV.  SMES THREAT AGENTS DISCUSSED 
This sub-section discusses the various threat agents that 
usually militate against most SMEs in developing economies.  
i. Natural Disasters – here encompass any event considered 
as force majeure in legal parlance or business settings, 
including flood, earthquake, fire outbreak, excavations, etc.  
Karley [35] asserts that heavy rains in Accra, Ghana, for 
example, hamper economic activities and “telecommunications 
[infrastructure] are submerged in waters.”  The threat agent of 
floods in Ghana and Nigeria are perennial events (c.f. 
www.ghanadistricts.gov.gh alludes to the fact, citing “similar 
incidents were recorded in 1995, 1997 and 2001”) [36].  
CORDIS [37] in its project on “Advancing ICT for 
Disaster Recovery Management (DRM) in Africa” attests to 
the impact of natural disasters on ICT infrastructure, writing: 
“Many developing countries in Africa are 
exposed to serious natural disaster risks and 
their need for an adequate ICT infrastructure 
supporting DRM is high.  Unfortunately, 
access to ICT knowledge and affordable ICT 
systems is often lacking.”   
ii. Poor authentication – basically the authentication 
implemented in most networks or systems are the single-factor 
type, where username and a password dual is required before 
granting access to the end-user.  This behooves enormous 
responsibility on the end-user to be cautious in choosing and 
administering his/her password.  For systems or resources that 
are sensitive, it is incumbent upon the systems administrator to 
procure multi-factor authentication techniques, such as 
hardware (e.g. smartcard) and/or software (e.g. digital 
certificates & tokens) second-factor or third-factor (e.g. 
biometrics), which can ensure higher levels of security posture 
for the systems.  Stronger passwords can be used with 
Canadian Journal on Computing in Mathematics, Natural Sciences, Engineering and Medicine Vol. 4 No. 1, February 2013 
 
41 
 
extended strings coupled with alphanumeric and special 
characters [38]. 
An exploratory analysis of the type of authentication 
techniques used by the SMEs revealed that most of them 
(80%) used single-factor authentication or lesser mode, as 
depicted in the Figure -1. 
 
no 
authentication
5%
single-factor
80%
second-factor 
(hardware)
7%
second-factor 
(software)
4%
third-
factor
4%
SMEs Authentication
 
Figure - 1: SMEs Authentication Techniques 
 
iii. Malware – is a term for malicious code or software, 
with the commonest forms as viruses and worms, which 
usually attacks computer systems or networks without the 
informed consent of the end-user [39].   Depending on the 
type and purposes of the malware, they may self-
propagate (e.g. viruses), self-replicate (e.g. worms), self-
discover (or has the ability to scan and discover other 
vulnerable assets, e.g. bots).  The infection with malware 
may start by opening an attachment of an email.  Some 
come through installation of software that have been 
compromised or are themselves malwares. 
The OECD [40] best describes what a malware is:  
“Malware can gain remote access to an 
information system, record and send data 
from that system to a third party without the 
user’s permission or knowledge, conceal 
that the information system has been 
compromised, disable security measures, 
damage the information system, or 
otherwise affect the data and system 
integrity.” 
At the advent of computer malware, it was more of a 
nuisance to the end-user than a realized risk.  With 
advancement in computer technologies, malwares have 
become very dangerous and disruptive due to their 
stealthy operations and sophistication of attacks.   
Bots are typically scripts or programs with the 
capability to perform predefined functions repeatedly and 
automatically after being triggered intentionally or through a 
system infection [41].  Originally bots were intended as a 
useful program for repetitive automated and time consuming 
tasks, such as search engines, coordinating file transfers and 
online games, but they got exploited for malicious intentions. 
For example, botnets have evolved as mere malware 
using Internet relay chat (IRC) protocols [42] to simulate 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, with great 
difficulty to trace and apprehend the botherder [43] [44].  
The malware threat agents come in various ways 
including running an executable malware, through 
unpatched software vulnerabilities, backdoors, brute force 
attacks, emails, an unauthorized instant message, infected 
website, etc.  Most malwares are transmitted like normal 
web traffic using regular ports, so as to evade firewalls 
and intrusion detection systems (IDS) [45]. 
iv. Hacking – is a process of breaking into one’s system 
or decrypting a password, or by accessing one’s network 
without authorization.  Technically, any system can be 
hacked from anywhere via the Internet by exploiting 
identified vulnerabilities.  Some of these vulnerabilities 
include a susceptible modem behind a firewall, 
weaknesses in TCP/IP and NetBIOS, exploiting an 
insecure wireless network, port scanning, packet sniffing, 
clickjacking, etc.   
The erroneous notions of hackers looking for secrets, 
or “there’s nothing attractive about one’s network”, have 
to be discarded.  On the contrary, hackers take advantage 
of unprotected systems and may hack into systems for 
various reasons, including using infected systems as 
launch pads to attack others, gaining access to financial 
information, intellectual property, or corporate sensitive 
information, etc. [46]. 
v. No Backup – backup is a process of archiving data 
or making copies of programs or data unto separate 
storage media or additional resources for the purposes of 
being used for restoration or recovery, and usually 
keeping them out-of-site for security reasons.  In the event 
of exploitation or attack, backups can be very useful to 
restore failed systems and/or restore corrupted data.  
Backups can greatly mitigate risks if the backups are 
robust and reliable [38].  Incidentally, most firms or end-
users do not backup regularly (outdated copies) nor store 
off-site. 
no backup
5%
once-a-
while
47%
monthly
13%
weekly
17%
daily
18%
SMEs with Backups
 
Figure - 2: SMEs Backup Trends 
 
An exploratory analysis into the study revealed that 
52% seldom backup, 13% backup monthly, 17% weekly 
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whilst 18% backup daily (see Figure -2), which compares 
with the mere 30% of Kenyan SMEs who backup 
regularly [47]. 
vi. Spyware (Adware) – spyware is a form of malware 
that spies on the user by stealthily collecting predefined 
user data for further actions [46].  They are usually 
installed unknowingly through web browsing or 
unprotected installations or downloads, especially as 
bundled freewares or peer-to-peer (P2P) applications.  
Typical examples of spyware are keystroke loggers, 
packet sniffers, instant messaging (IM) aggregators, etc.  
Adwares are not quite distinct from spyware except that 
they are usually used by some marketing firms (called 
sponsors) to collect information on users.  The sponsors 
earn revenue through these adverts.  They usually come in 
the form of pop-ups, “sponsored” freewares, toolbars, etc. 
vii. Power failure – is the event of power supply outage 
to the ICT resources.  It can be augmented with standby 
diesel engine generators (DEGs) or uninterruptible power 
supply (UPS) or solar cell power supplies to hold forth 
and supply power to essential resources in the event of 
outages.  The augmented power supply are usually 
installed in functionally hot-standby mode, i.e. upon 
sensing commercial power failure, the standby units take-
over automatically.  In fact, due to the sensitive nature of 
the essential communications resources, the power supply 
is usually “sensitive” to power fluctuations and that any 
fluctuations outside the tolerance range are cut-off for 
smooth take-over by the conditioned UPS or other 
standby supply.  For typical data centers or server farms, 
there are at least 2 different sources of UPS to ensure 
seamless switchovers [38]. 
viii. Un-scanned Attachment – this threat agent usually 
attacks when users open attachments to email messages 
without scanning them with up-to-date anti-virus software.  
In the corporate environments, most firms have policies 
dealing with email attachments.  However, some end-users 
ignore or violate the policies and open unsuspecting 
attachments, e.g. “I Love You” (2005) or “Melissa” 
(1999) viruses. 
This threat agent usually operates in concert with the 
last two agents, i.e. spam and social engineering. 
ix. Spam is basically unsolicited email messages, 
usually received from unknown senders with “blank 
copied” numerous addressees.  Spams could be spoofed as 
coming from legitimate or known sources and may have 
enticing content luring users to take certain detrimental 
actions [48].  In view of the growing awareness about 
spams and attachment threat agents, some spoof users 
with yet an enticing link.  When users click on the link, 
the necessary scripts or programs are executed and the 
system may be infected or attacked or used as launch 
pads. 
x. Social engineering is the “practice” of manipulating or 
luring end-users to divulge confidential information by 
appealing to their sense of social norms, with the aim to gain 
access to one’s system [46].  This threat agent exploits the 
vulnerability of end-users, e.g. receptionists, to solicit access 
credentials.  The social engineer exploits and leverages on pre-
existing trusted relationship amongst a victim and the assumed 
entity, to lure the victim to take some detrimental actions [49].  
Some examples of social engineering are information gathered 
via telephone calls purporting to be a system administrator, or 
a consultant or a visitor asking to use a corporate computer, 
etc. 
The imprecision in the cyber-threats and associated 
likelihood of maturity is represented by fuzzy numbers.  
Various fuzzy similarity measures are in literature, however, 
this paper only reviewed those few measures that easily give 
credence to the threat agents taxonomy.  It suffices to say that 
some of the methods would have ranked the threats differently, 
but the essence for a standardized cyber-threats taxonomy 
remains pertinent.   
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Advancement in ICTs and globalization have motivated 
SMEs to embrace the Internet as vital business tools, for 
operations and business communications.  Closely associated 
with these enormous opportunities are vulnerabilities and 
threats, which pose serious risks to all businesses, especially 
SMEs and more so if located in developing or emerging 
economies. 
Also confronting today’s tech-savvy business managers are 
plethora of operational and strategic decisions.  Amongst the 
strategic aspects of business decisions are the challenges of 
cyber-security and information assurance.  New and innovative 
security challenges confront the SMEs on a daily basis, thus 
exploiting most “zero-day” vulnerabilities.   This results in 
various losses to the SMEs, even with the possibility of 
business closure.  SMEs ought to ensure that their networks 
and systems are both available and secured.  The decision 
scenarios are mainly subjective and are usually fraught with 
lots of uncertainties. 
Cognizant of the above, any proposed solutions must 
necessarily be holistic and account for the intrinsic nature of 
the decision attributes and alternatives.  Fuzzy multi-attributes 
decision-making techniques are suitable for the analysis and 
evaluation of threat agents taxonomy.  
This study has been about being able to identify some key 
threats and to prefer proactive mitigation measures to deal with 
them.  This study identified the ten (10) top-most threats that 
commonly exploit SMEs in developing economies.  Again, 
fuzzy similarity measures were applied with multi-attribute 
decision-making techniques to benchmark the taxonomy of 
threat agents. These threat agents are natural disasters that are 
perennial in developing economies, poor authentication 
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methods, power outages and failure – another perennial 
problem in developing economies, viruses, hacking, no 
backups, un-scanned attachments, spamming, spywares, and 
social engineering due to apparent gullibility of most cultures 
in developing economies. 
These simple approaches employed in identifying and 
creating the taxonomy are geared towards assisting SMEs to 
have some base metrics for referencing in risk management 
and information assurance. 
Accurate identification of critical assets can lead to 
proactive detection and preventive measures that ultimately 
can mitigate the associated risks.   
In conclusion, the novel approach of evaluating cyber-
threats based on intuitive, subjective and holistic assessment 
aimed at creating a taxonomy to fill the void created by the 
lack of standardized lists of threats.  At least, SMEs can have 
some empirical basis of cyber-threats to benchmark their 
business and security performance metrics, rather than relying 
upon the usual “TV news effect” of most-publicized 
compromises with disproportionate mitigation measures.  
Future research work will be focused on exploring other 
fuzzy relational measures, the differences resulting from other 
fuzzy similarity measures and their axioms.  
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